The idea of rearranging generation assets amongst firms to improve competition has once again surfaced in a recent report on improvements to the New Zealand Electricity Market. We show with examples that rearranging assets, either with asset divestiture to a new firm, or asset swaps between existing firms, may actually reduce competition in electricity markets. Our examples emphasize features that are particular to electricity, such as seasonality and transmission constraints. These results warn that applying economic rules of thumb to electricity markets may lead to erroneous conclusions.
Introduction
In April 2009 the New Zealand Commerce Commission released a report undertaken by Stanford University Professor Frank Wolak that assessed the performance of the New Zealand Electricity Market (henceforth NZEM) [8] . This study concluded that there was evidence firms were exercising market power in the market, and estimated how frequently this occurred and the resulting changes in market prices. Wolak also concluded that the bulk of this exercise of market power happened during dry periods such as the summer of 2006, when water inflows into New Zealand's hydro storage lakes were low. The Wolak report contained a number of suggestions for the improvement of the NZEM. In particular the Wolak report suggested an 'asset swap' between the North and South Island generators in order to enhance competition between thermal generators, especially during periods of water shortage. Subsequent to the release of this report, a ministerial review of the electricity market was undertaken and a discussion paper was produced by the Electricity Technical Advisory Group [3] . This discussion paper also contained asset swap suggestions along the lines suggested by Wolak, as well as asset divesting options -breaking up existing firms to create additional firms in the market. As of December 2009, the New Zealand government has just released details of how it will rearrange the market. Most of the Electricity Technical Advisory Group's recommendations were accepted. In particular, the Government intends to implement a 'virtual asset swap' by requiring generators in different islands to enter into long-term contracts with each other. We analyze this type of swap in section 3 of this paper.
Worldwide, the breaking up and swapping of assets is relatively common in power markets. A recent example is the asset swap between German E.ON and Belgian Electrabel 1 . There are two broad arguments in favour. First, the breaking up and swapping of assets can be a mechanism to stimulate competition in wholesale electricity markets, thereby lowering prices. Intuitively, breaking up and exchanging assets can lead to an increased number of players in a market. Classical results from economics literature state that in a Cournot game, as the number of players increases, the market clearing price approaches the marginal cost of production 2 . Also, Hope [4] observed that mergers of hydro and thermal generation can create firms who are in a stronger position to exercise market power. A second argument says that generators may be able to hedge their generation risks better by swapping assets. However, modelling risk attitudes related to asset swaps is a complicated task and beyond the scope of this paper. Therefore we will not model risk here and hope to return to this important question in a subsequent body of work.
In this paper, we consider the impact of asset divesting and swapping policies on prices and consumer surplus. Asset rearrangements are typically designed to increase the number of players in the market or submarkets, because as per the intuition discussed above, increasing the number of players should have a positive effect on competition. However, we identify two distinct additional negative effects arising from such rearrangements, either of which can overwhelm this positive effect. The first is a potentially detrimental change in relative costs between differing generation technologies. We find that although an asset swap such as that suggested by Wolak increases the number of thermal generators and can enhance the market performance during dry periods, it can have the opposite effect during wet periods. This is because the value of water relative to the cost of thermal generation changes between wet and dry periods and therefore the steady state production and hence the market clearing price will change 3 . We find a similar result for asset divesting. The second negative effect arises when transmission constraints exist. We show that, although asset swaps of the kind suggested by Wolak can enhance the market outcomes in a perfect market, they can lead to congestion when an underlying transmission system is involved. This is an example of the general theory of second best that manifests in economics literature frequently dating back to 1950s [5] . Here the introduction of an 'improvement' actually leads to line constraints binding which itself leads to a worse market outcome in steady state.
In the remainder of the paper, we begin by presenting a series of counterexamples showing that even in the simplest of markets without transmission constraints, both asset swapping and asset divestiture may lead to less competitive outcomes with higher prices. We then give additional counterexamples in both cases to demonstrate how network constraints can confound what would otherwise be a straightforward improvement in competition. We conclude with a specific case study of the New Zealand market, where we consider the impact of both the asset swapping and asset divestiture recommendations made by the Ministerial Inquiry.
Core Model
In this section we discuss how we model the strategic behaviour of firms using Cournot games over transmission networks. As in the traditional Cournot paradigm, we model strategic firms that commit to generation levels for each of their plants. Unlike traditional commodities modelled in a Cournot framework, electricity is not a storable commodity and its flow over a transmission network must comply with a set of physical constraints 4 . Once the firms commit to generation levels for each of their plants, prices are determined by an independent system operator (ISO), whose role is to choose line flows to maximize total welfare while ensuring the flows are compatible with the physical constraints. The payoff for each of the firms is calculated by their revenue (price × quantity) less their running costs, which are detailed in the following paragraph.
We allow for firms to own two types of generation technology, which for convenience we will call thermal and hydro. Each thermal plant has a quadratic cost function c T (q) = T q + tq 2 , where q is electricity generation in MWh 5 , and each hydro plant has a quadratic cost function c H (q) = Hq + hq 2 . We assume all the parameters H, T, h, t are non-negative. These cost functions will typically be different; for example we will always assume H < T , since the short-run costs of a hydro generator are almost always lower than those of a thermal generator 6 . Furthermore, we do not explicitly model any capacity constraints on generators, as we can set the h and t terms to act as a proxy for capacity constraints, since these can significantly steepen each respective generator's cost curve if set high. A particularly useful way to think about h is a measure of water scarcity. If h is low, hydro costs are low, indicating a surplus of water. A high h results in a relatively high cost for hydro generation, which can be thought of as a high opportunity cost resulting from a shortage of water.
We model demand for electricity at node i by a linear demand function of the form D i (p i ) = a i − b i p i , where p i is the market spot price at that node, and a i and b i are positive constants 7 . As outlined above, firms compete to satisfy this demand using a variation on the Cournot paradigm. Every firm chooses a quantity of electricity for each of its plants to sell. The market price at each node is determined from the conventional optimal power flow problem, solved by the ISO where the objective is to maximize total surplus over the network while complying with electricity flow constraints ( [1] , [9] ) 8 . This extension of the familiar Cournot model reduces to the conventional Cournot model when there is only one node in the network, or when there are no binding transmission constraints. Our choice of a linear demand function and convex cost functions for each generator ensures there is always a unique equilibrium outcome to our model in the default one-node case 9 .
There are different ways of modelling Cournot competition in the presence of transmission constraints, depending on how much information is provided to the firms. Borenstein, Bushnell, and Stoft [2] analyze a full-rationality Cournot model, where the firms anticipate the effect their generation decisions have on congestion in the network and ultimately the nodal prices.
In their paper, they present a collection of two-node examples and discuss the concept of a constrained Cournot equilibrium versus an unconstrained Cournot equilibrium. In the former, the transmission line linking the two nodes is constrained at equilibrium whereas in the latter, the line is unconstrained. The downside of a full rationality model of this type is that, in general, existence or uniqueness of pure-strategy equilibria cannot be guaranteed; we must now consider three possible types of equilibrium. One equilibrium can occur when the line is congested, another when the line is uncongested, and there may be a 'mixed strategy' equilibrium where there is a positive probability (but not certainty) that the line is congested 10 . An alternative approach is to use a bounded-rationality method (see e.g. [10] ) whereby firms are unaware of how their actions may affect congestion. The latter method is arguably less realistic, and does not capture the ability of firms to exploit transmission, however, a unique pure-strategy equilibrium is guaranteed. In this paper, as we are particularly interested in the impact of transmission, we employ Borenstein et al.'s full-rationality equilibrium concept, expanded appropriately to a network with any finite number of nodes. The optimization problem faced by the ISO is presented in the appendix.
Analysis of Asset Swapping
In this section we demonstrate how swapping of assets can lead to higher prices and reduced welfare results. We discuss two features that are special to electricity markets. The first feature is that in electricity markets such as the NZEM where a substantial proportion of electricity is generated through 8 The optimal power flow problem is repeated in the appendix of this paper for the reader's convenience 9 Uniqueness follows for example from Vives [7] pages 96-99 and Theorem 2.8. 10 When mixed strategy equilibria exist, there are potentially many such equilibria.
hydro resources, the cost of production of electricity is variable. Hence an asset swap that might make sense for dry years may not yield the desired outcome in absence of a drought. Our first example focuses on analyzing this effect in isolation.
The second feature is the electricity transmission network. Electricity must be transmitted through a network and must comply with the physical constraints of such a network. These constraints can distort the effects of an asset swap in such a way as to reverse the intended outcome. We discuss an example that analyzes the effect of transmission network constraints on the asset swap outcome.
Without Transmission Constraints
Here we present a specific example of asset swapping where the assets of two existing firms are 'swapped'. The swap we choose is aimed at increasing the number of firms owning thermal generators and the number of firms owning hydro generators; in other words, making the firms more symmetric. As we discussed in the introduction, the accepted intuition is that a swap in this case will increase competition and drive down prices. Unfortunately, this is not always correct.
Consider an electricity network with no transmission constraints 11 , on which demand is given by D (p) = 500 − p. There are two firms selling electricity. Firm A owns two hydro generators and firm B owns two thermal generators. We fix thermal generation costs at C T (q) = 100q + 0.2q 2 , and hydro generation costs at C H (q) = 10q + hq 2 . Note that for the hydro costs we have fixed the coefficient on the linear term quite low relative to thermal generators, while we have left the coefficient on the quadratic term as a parameter, which we will alter to simulate wet versus dry conditions. We investigate a particular asset swap where firm A gives firm B a hydro generator in exchange for a thermal generator. This is illustrated in figure 1 . However, an asset swap of this nature with no transmission constraints will typically improve welfare. In figure 2 , we compare welfare before and after the swap across a range of possible hydro costs. We see that in a dry year or particularly wet year, the swap is welfare improving, and the market price falls. Interestingly though, when hydro costs are in the mid-range, the asset swap actually leads to higher market prices. How do these results come about? In some respects, this result is intuitive. If hydro costs become very cheap, then firms will use mostly hydro generation.
When one firm has a monopoly on hydro, then it can take advantage by restricting output, to push up the price. The other firm, owning thermal generators with their higher costs, is left at a considerable disadvantage.
In this case, splitting the hydro generators amongst more firms improves competition. Here, the breakup of the hydro generator drives the result. On the other hand, when hydro generators are very expensive, the opposite intuition applies. Now thermal generators are pivotal, and the split allows for an extra competitor in the thermal market, again pushing down the price.
The asset swap changes the generation technologies available to each firm, causing a change in relative costs between the two firms. In either of the two cases above, one firm gains, lowering its costs relative to the other firm. The worst outcome for competition is in the middle range. Here, the swapping of assets leads to a slight reduction in total production of the plants. This is because there is insufficient increase in competition in hydro to offset the reduction in usage of the comparatively expensive thermals.
With Transmission Constraints
Now we consider the impact of transmission constraints on an asset swap. We present a counterexample to demonstrate that the introduction of a transmission constraint can reverse what would otherwise be an improvement in competition. For our example, we consider a network with two nodes. At node 1, demand is given by D 1 (p) = 500 − 2p, and at node 2 demand is given by D 2 (p) = 1000 − p 13 . There is a single transmission line connecting the two nodes, which we will assume has no line losses, but is subject to a capacity constraint, being able to carry only 500MW in either direction. Assume that hydro generation costs are C H (q) = 10q + 0.1q 2 , and thermal generation costs are C T (q) = 30q + 0.2q 2 . Here we have fixed h = 0.1, as we are no longer analyzing the effects of changing relative costs. Firm A owns two hydro assets at node 1, and firm B owns two thermal assets at node 2. Under Cournot competition, the initial prices before are p 1 = p 2 = 219.88, and consumer welfare is 305201. Now perform a similar asset swap to the previous subsection -firm A gives firm B a hydro generator in exchange for a thermal generator. If the line were unconstrained, after the swap, the prices at both nodes would be 215.69, and consumer welfare would rise to 308751. However, with the transmission constraint, the line becomes congested, and the firms withhold at node 2. The prices after the swap are instead p 1 = 211.76, p 2 = 223.54. Because demand is higher at node 2, there is an overall loss of consumer welfare, which falls to 302915 after the swap. This counterexample illustrates the fundamental idea that transmission constraints can negate welfare improvements from rearranging assets. In the next section, we will demonstrate a similar result in the asset divestiture case with loop flows. The cause of the drop lies in strategic behaviour by firms. In our model, firms typically make higher profits when transmission lines are constrained, as this divides the network into submarkets with fewer players. Thus there are times when firms have an incentive to choose output such that the transmission line is congested in the resulting equilibrium. Paradoxically, since giving firms assets at multiple nodes is a stated goal of rearranging assets, this congested outcome is more easily achieved when firms have assets at both nodes, as now no firm loses market share due to a line congesting toward them.
Analysis of Asset Divestiture
In this section we demonstrate how divesting of assets to a new firm can also lead to higher prices and reduced welfare. We discuss the same two features that we did in section 3: the variation in the cost of water, and the impact of transmission constraints. We generate counterexamples to show that both features may cause asset divesting to lower welfare in electricity markets.
Without Transmission Constraints
We begin by presenting a specific example of asset divestiture, where assets from existing firms are given to a new entrant, but the resulting market price is higher than before divestiture. Let demand be given by D (p) = 500 − p, and fix hydro generation costs at C H (q) = 10q + 0.1q 2 , thermal generation costs at C T (q) = 30q + q 2 . Now suppose there is a network with no transmission constraints, and two firms, each of which own one thermal and one hydro generator on the network.
Consider the following divestiture arrangement. A new firm is created, and is given a hydro asset from each of the existing firms. Before this divestiture, the Cournot market price is 193.14. After the divestiture, the Cournot market price becomes 205.41 -an increase over the initial price, indicating reduced competition. Thus we have created an example where the market has gone from two firms to three firms, yet competition is reduced. This choice of example is obviously contrived, since it gives one firm all the low cost assets, whereas before they were split evenly. This leaves a single dominant firm, the new entrant, in the market, leading to a loss in competitiveness. Any other rearrangement of assets to form a new generator would have led to a welfare improvement, even giving the new firm two thermal generators.
Like the asset swapping case, this example works because of the difference in relative costs between the two different types of technologies. We have chosen h = 0.1, which means the hydro generators are relatively cheap to run. Figure 5 shows welfare before and after the divestiture as a function of h. If hydro costs were higher, then even this unusual asset divestiture would cause an improvement in welfare. 
With Transmission Constraints
The previous section used asymmetric firms to demonstrate how an asset divestiture in a single node network may reduce welfare. Now we show that transmission constraints can cause the same effect, even when all generators are symmetric. We create a three-node network, depicted in figure 6 on the next page. All transmission lines are assumed to have the same reactance.
There is a single thermal generator at each node, with zero costs. There are two firms; firm A owns a generator at node 1, and firm B owns the generators at nodes 2 and 3. Demand at the three nodes is given by
Suppose we divest one of firm B's assets and give it to a new firm, denoted firm C. Each firm now owns one generator at a single node. If the transmission lines were all unconstrained, asset divestiture in this example would lead to an improvement in welfare. Before divestiture, we had q 1 = 133.33, q 2 + q 3 = 133.33 and prices at all nodes equal to 44.44, resulting in consumer welfare equal to 15185. After the divestiture, we have q 1 = q 2 = q 3 = 100, all prices fall to 33.33, and consumer welfare increases to 18333. In this case, each firm is paid the same price for electricity, and additional supply by any generator has the same impact on the price. Now suppose the line between nodes 2 and 3 has a capacity constraint, say with maximum capacity K. If this line is congested in equilibrium, then the nodal prices, as a function of nodal injections, are
K.
The new network constraint means that the value of the electricity produced by a generator is dependent upon the node at which that generator is located. If the injection at a node causes greater congestion on the constrained line, the marginal price at that node is lower than injecting at a node which relieves the congestion. Also note that injecting power at node 2 increases the price at node 3; this is due to the loop constraint requiring that additional power be exported from node 3.
Using the price functions derived above, and setting K = 20, the equilibrium before divestiture is now q 1 = 133.33, q 2 = 56.67, and q 3 = 76.67 (recall generators 2 and 3 are owned by the same firm), prices are p 1 Once the generation at node 3 is divested to a new entrant, firm B (at node 2) is no longer concerned with the impact of its generation on the price at node 3. Due to the fact that the electricity generated at nodes 2 and 3 are strategic complements (producing more at one node increases the incentive to produce more at the other node), having both generators owned by the same firm, actually increases the output of the generators and lowers the prices at all nodes in the network. Again, as in the asset swapping example, the existence of transmission constraints renders invalid the intuition that asset divestiture automatically improves competition.
Finally note that the key constraint here is the loop effect. Unlike our previous congestion counterexamples, here the constrained line is congested both before and after asset divesting, however welfare is still worse after the divestiture.
Case Study: The New Zealand Market
In this section we create a two-node model loosely inspired by the New Zealand market, to examine the implications of rearranging generation assets as suggested both by the Wolak Report ( [8] , A1.20) and the Ministerial Review ( [3] , Recommendation 17). New Zealand has two main islands, the North and South Islands, whose power grids are connected by a high voltage direct current line, commonly abbreviated to the 'HVDC line'. The North Island is far more populated and industrial, and therefore is the source of much of the load. However the South Island has most of New Zealand's hydro generation, so the HVDC line is a critical link to move this power north. Although there are some local transmission constraints within each island, the constraint imposed by the HVDC line is arguably the most important of the network constraints.
We assume the market operates over two nodes, which represent the South Island and the North Island. The two islands are linked by an transmission line with fixed transmission capacity (K) and no line losses, which represents the HVDC line. Initially, we allow for four firms in the market. Firm A owns two hydro generators in the South Island, firm B owns two thermal generators in the North Island, firm C owns 1 hydro generator in the North Island, and firm D owns 1 hydro generator in the South Island, and 1 thermal generator in the North Island. The cost functions for all the hydro generators are identical, and are set to c H (q) = 10q + hq 2 , whereas the cost functions for all the thermal generators are given by c T (q) = 30q + 0.2q 2 . As we discussed in section 2, these choices of cost functions are designed to represent the fact that hydro plants generate electricity more cheaply than thermal plants, and the h parameter allows us to change the value of water, altering the relative costs of the two technologies.
Demand in the South Island is modelled by D S (p S ) = 500a − 1.5p S . Demand in the North Island is modelled by D N (p N ) = 1000a − p N . The parameter a is a variable representing the demand level in New Zealand. A low value of a corresponds to low demand throughout New Zealand, such as that which occurs overnight, and similarly, a high value of a can be thought of as corresponding to the 6pm peak. For now we will fix a = 1. We emphasize that although this model is inspired by the New Zealand market, it has no generator capacity constraints, no forward markets, and no other technical constraints aside from the HVDC line, and thus one should use caution in interpreting the results directly to New Zealand.
In the analysis that follows, we analyze the impact of both the asset swap, and the asset divesting recommendations made by the Ministerial Inquiry. These are roughly based on Recommendations 17.3 and 17.1 respectively of the Report, appropriately adapted for the model we have created. This swap involves giving one thermal generator to a South Island generator who previously had none, in exchange for a hydro generator given to a North Island generator who previously had only thermal generators. The divesting option creates a new firm, who takes ownership of one hydro generator from the South Island and one thermal generator from the North Island. We examine the impact of each option on nodal prices, consumer surplus, and total welfare relative to the status quo.
Asset Swap
We model the asset swap as an exchange between firm A and firm B. Firm A gives one of its South Island hydro generators to firm B, and firm B gives one of its North Island thermal generators to firm A. As stated by the Ministerial Inquiry, this ensures that the number of firms competing in the South Island increases by one, the number of firms competing in the North Island increases by one, and the number of firms with thermal generators increases by one. We illustrate this swap in figure 7. 
Without Transmission Constraints
We begin, as in section 3, by discussing the impact of the asset swap assuming there are no transmission constraints. In our model, this equates to an assumption that K is infinitely large. While obviously unrealistic, this assumption provides an important base case. With no transmission constraints, the two islands are essentially one market, with a single market price covering both islands. In figure 8 , we graph the market price before and after the asset swap across the range of hydro costs, holding demand fixed at a = 1. Our unconstrained example in section 3 found that an asset swap improved competition in very wet or very dry years, but decreased it otherwise. This observation shows up again in our New Zealand model. Figure 8 shows that the market price will be lower after the asset swap when hydro opportunity costs are either high or low. The price may decrease by as much as 8%. On the other hand, not visible in figure 8 , the price after the swap does increase for a small range of h, in this case between 0.2 and 0.27. The increase is minuscule compared to our previous example, reaching a maximum difference of 0.1034, or 0.05%. Thus in the New Zealand model, the asset swap generally improves welfare, albeit by a small amount, assuming the capacity of the HVDC capacity is sufficiently large.
The asset swap has a significant effect on quantity of electricity produced by the two generation technologies. In a wet year, when hydro opportunity costs are low, the asset swap allows firm B to produce cheaper electricity using its new hydro plant. Because firm A no longer monopolizes the South Island hydros, and given the parameters of our model, the net effect is that the two South Island hydro plants produce more electricity than they did before. Since the bulk of the demand is in the North Island, this significantly increases utilization of the HVDC line. In a dry year, thermal generation in the North Island increases after the swap, causing lower utilization of the HVDC line 15 . This effect is highlighted in figure 9 on the next page.
This latter result is significant. Improving the geographic spread of the firms leads to greater use of the HVDC line as firms move to minimize their costs of generation. For this reason, if the line does have some maximum rated capacity, then it is more likely to be constrained after an asset swap than before. We will show in the next section that constraining the HVDC line can cause a large drop in welfare, a larger drop indeed than any potential improvement if the line does not congest. 
With Transmission Constraints
The Ministerial Review raised concerns over the fact that, if the HVDC line were to become constrained, the New Zealand market would split into separate North Island and South Island markets. When this happened, they wrote, each island would have fewer firms competing (three and two respectively) than if the HVDC line were unconstrained. The Wolak Report raised similar concerns 16 . Both reports highlighted the claim that an asset swap would increase the number of competitors in both islands, and thus they argued, would increase competition, driving down prices.
These arguments are classic in the economics literature, and in this section we will demonstrate this effect using our New Zealand model. However, there is a counter-effect not considered in the Ministerial Review. In section 3 we showed that an asset swap could cause a transmission line to 'flip' from uncongested to congested, with negative consequences for welfare. Such a scenario is indeed possible in our New Zealand model. We show that when the HVDC line 'flips' to a congested state, the resulting decrease in welfare far outweighs the gain from having more firms in each island. On the other hand, such a scenario only occurs for a tight range of demand, and we will show that there is often a net gain in welfare.
To analyze this counter-effect, we will fix h = 0.2, and the capacity of the HVDC line at K = 260MW for the remainder of this section. This choice is deliberate. When h = 0.2 and the HVDC line is unconstrained, there are no welfare effects from the change in relative costs. The welfare changes we observe in this section can thus be attributed solely to transmission constraints and increased/decreased competition due to the asset swap. We allow demand to vary, by varying a from 1. In figure 10 , we show the impact of the asset swap on consumer welfare before and after the asset swap. Figure 10 depicts one possible outcome of a reallocation of assets on total consumer welfare across a range of demand. When demand is low, the HVDC line is unconstrained before and after the swap, and there is no change in welfare. This is unsurprising; we deliberately chose h to ensure there were no welfare differences when the HVDC line was unconstrained. When demand is high however, the HVDC line is constrained in equilibrium both before and after the swap. In this case we see a significant jump in welfare, as postulated by Wolak and the Ministerial Review. There are now a greater number of competitors in each island, who offer more electricity into the market in equilibrium. Thus prices fall in both islands, and consumer welfare rises.
The most interesting case, however, is in the mid-range of demand. Here the 'before' scenario involved a single market with four firms. After the asset swap, the markets split into two, with three and four firms respectively. Although there is only a small decrease in the number of firms competing in each island, in the North Island in particular there is far less generation available. The generators take advantage of this to reduce their dispatch offers, so the asset swap causes quite a big decrease in welfare. We graph North Island prices before and after the swap in figure 11 . On the other hand, prices in the South Island uniformly decrease after the swap. We graph South Island prices in figure 12. The three graphs in figures 10 -12 indicate that, for our choice of parameters, an asset swap is effective in increasing welfare when the HVDC line is frequently congested. This result agrees with the intuition expressed in the Wolak and Ministerial reports. However, when the HVDC line is initially uncongested, such as when demand is low, our model predicts one of two outcomes. Either there is no impact on welfare, or there could be a substantial decrease in welfare if the swap caused the HVDC line to become congested. Once again, we have held h = 0.2 for this section, and we know from the above results that for low or high h there may be a moderate increase in welfare when the HVDC line is uncongested. This increase should be accounted for when weighing the potential benefits and costs of any asset swap.
One of the most important points to arise from these results is the importance of the HVDC line. If the HVDC line had little capacity, then the constrained equilibria are most likely to arise, and our model would predict that welfare would normally rise as a result of the swap. On the other hand, if the HVDC line had limitless capacity, the asset swap policy would be largely ineffectual, with perhaps a small increase if h were particularly low or high. In the next section, we focus specifically on the interplay between HVDC capacity and welfare.
Increasing HVDC Capacity
The previous sections have indicated that the transmission capacity of the HVDC line is an important determinant of consumer welfare in New Zealand. Any congestion on the HVDC line splits the market into two. This reduces competition, often causing significant price differences between the two islands. The Wolak Report largely dismissed transmission constraints, noting that they occurred infrequently. However note that in our model, an asset swap would increase flows on the HVDC line, potentially increasing the chance of congesting the line. In this next figure, we illustrate the importance of the HVDC's transmission capacity to consumer welfare in our model, both before and after the asset swap.
For this graph, we hold demand constant (a = 1) and hydro costs constant (h = 0.1). This choice of parameters gives medium demand and a relatively wet year, indicating a higher flow on the HVDC line. On the left hand side of the graph, the HVDC line is congested. As we would expect, increasing HVDC capacity increases welfare in this region, but there is also a large increase in welfare between K = 250 and K = 300 as the HVDC line transitions from congested to uncongested in the equilibrium outcome. Once the HVDC line is uncongested, there are no further welfare gains possible from adding additional HVDC capacity. Again, the benefit of an asset swap occurs 
Summary
Our modelling suggests that New Zealand would derive most benefit from the asset swap if the HVDC line were heavily constrained. In this situation, the North and South Island are two separate markets, and there is considerable benefit in increasing the number of firms in each individual market. With the line frequently congested, the case where the asset swap causes the line to switch from uncongested to congested is likely to occur only at times of low demand. On the other hand, if the HVDC line has a higher constraint, and is rarely congested, then our modelling suggests the asset swap has little benefit, and may even be costly (in terms of consumer welfare).
We identified additional benefits to the asset swap arising from changing relative costs, but these were small compared to welfare changes due to line constraints, and do not impact on the above conclusions. One major policy implication of our work is that increasing HVDC capacity could realize many of the benefits of an asset swap, without the negative consequences.
Asset Divesting
An alternative recommendation of the Ministerial Working Group's report, Recommendation 17.1, was to divest assets from two of the existing firms and create a new firm with assets in both the North and South Islands 18 . Again this recommendation would create one new generator in the South Island, and one new generator in the North Island. In our model, we mimic this by creating a new firm E. Firm E takes one hydro plant in the South Island from firm A, and one thermal plant in the North Island from firm B. The new market structure is depicted in figure 14. 
Without Transmission Constraints
Again we begin by analyzing the equilibrium outcomes if the HVDC line were completely unconstrained. In this case, the result is unambiguous. Divesting causes a significant improvement in welfare (a lower market price) across the range of hydro opportunity costs. Figure 15 illustrates this result.
Like the asset swap, the asset divestiture increases utilization of the HVDC line in wet years. This is illustrated in figure 16 . However, the effect is not as large as in the asset swap case. For any value of h, the HVDC is used less after divestiture than after an asset swap. This effect occurs because 
With Transmission Constraints
We finish with a brief analysis of how the asset divestiture affects market competition across a range of possible demand. The results and intuition are similar to those in section 5.1. An asset divestiture may cause consumer welfare to either increase or decrease. However, figure 17 below shows that the result is likely to be an increase more often than not. A decrease will typically only occur for a small range of demand around a = 1. There is because, as compared to the asset swap case, there is less scope for firms to strategically congest the line in search of higher profits. The asset divestiture improves welfare significantly when the HVDC line is unconstrained. Once again, North Island prices drive the result in welfare. The two final figures  (18 and 19) show that South Island prices will always decrease after the divestiture, the negative impact on consumer welfare is apparent in the North Island prices, which spike sharply for midrange demand levels. 
Summary
Our modelling has found the asset divestiture policy to have similar implications to the asset swap. Again, it is most useful when the HVDC is heavily constrained, causing price decreases of up to roughly 20%. However, when the HVDC is unconstrained, asset divesting may still be a good policy, as there is a significant improvement in welfare even when there are no transmission constraints. Prices could still fall by as much as 14%. Either way, the asset divesting policy we modelled appears to dominate the asset swap.
Conclusions
Asset swaps and divestitures beguile regulators looking for a quick and easy way 19 to improve competition in electricity markets. The idea that increasing the number of firms owning certain technologies, or located at certain nodes, increases competition is attractive, and easy to understand.
In this paper we have shown two factors that work against this intuition. The first is relative costs. When firms have a range of different technologies at their disposal, an asset swap or divestiture has the potential to cause a decrease in welfare. This is less likely to occur with asset divestitures, provided the proposed divestiture is sensible, but the possibility should be accounted for. An aggravating factor here is that relative costs may change seasonally if there are hydro generators in the mix, because the opportunity cost of water can change. Thus a rearrangement of assets that works, say, in wet years may do just the opposite in dry years. The second factor is network constraints. Network constraints can split markets into multiple submarkets. Commonsense intuition says that ensuring there are more firms within each submarket should increase competition; however, we have identified a mitigating factor. When firms own assets at multiple nodes, they have t he ability (and incentive) to choose output to congest transmission lines, so a previously unconstrained equilibrium may now actually be constrained. In the New Zealand example, we demonstrated that such an effect could occur for certain ranges of parameters.
Our results suggest that some caution be taken when considering asset rearrangements. The impact on welfare is highly dependent on the relative costs of various technologies, and factors such as hydro opportunity costs and varying demand. The costs and benefits of such a move should always be weighed up against alternative measures to improve the depth of the market, particularly improvements in transmission, which we showed to be potentially very beneficial in the New Zealand case.
